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ABSTRACT
Issuers of initial public offerings ~IPOs! can report earnings in excess of cash f lows
by taking positive accruals. This paper provides evidence that issuers with unusu-
ally high accruals in the IPO year experience poor stock return performance in the
three years thereafter. IPO issuers in the most “aggressive” quartile of earnings
managers have a three-year aftermarket stock return of approximately 20 percent
less than IPO issuers in the most “conservative” quartile. They also issue about 20
percent fewer seasoned equity offerings. These differences are statistically and
economically significant in a variety of specifications.
SEVERAL STUDIES FIND THAT INITIAL public offerings ~IPOs! underperform after
the issue.1 Over a three-year holding period after the offering, Ritter ~1991!
reports substantially lower stock returns ~mean of 227 percent and median
of 255 percent! for a sample of 1,526 IPOs going public between 1975 and
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1 For example, Stoll and Curley ~1970!, Stern and Borstein ~1985!, Ritter ~1991!, and Lough-
ran and Ritter ~1995! find poor subsequent performance for IPOs. Ibbotson ~1975! reports sta-
tistically insignificant negative performance in the second through fourth post-issue years and
positive performance in the first and fifth years. In contrast, Buser and Chan ~1987! report
positive performance in the first two post-issue years; Ritter ~1991! discusses possible reasons
for the differences in the findings. Jain and Kini ~1994!, Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah ~1997!,
and Teoh, Wong, and Rao ~1998! examine the accounting performance of issuers in detail. There
is also now a growing literature explaining IPO stock return underperformance as related to
institutional holdings ~Field ~1995!!, venture capital ~Brav and Gompers ~1997!!, investment
banker recommendations, and analysts’ characteristics ~see footnote 4!.
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1984 than for a size- and industry-matched sample of seasoned firms. Ritter
conjectures that “investors are periodically overoptimistic about the earn-
ings potential of young growth companies.”
Our paper explores a possible source for this overoptimism. Issuers can
report unusually high earnings by adopting discretionary accounting accrual
adjustments that raise reported earnings relative to actual cash f lows. If
buyers are guided by earnings but are unaware that earnings are inf lated
by the generous use of accruals, they could pay too high a price. As infor-
mation about the firm is revealed over time by the media, analysts’ reports,
and subsequent financial statements, investors may recognize that earnings
are not maintaining momentum, and the investors may thus lose their op-
timism. Other things equal, the greater the earnings management at the
time of the offering, the larger the ultimate price correction. Therefore, our
study examines whether discretionary accruals predict the cross-sectional
variation in post-IPO long-run stock return performance.
Our accruals variable is reported in the fiscal year when the firm goes
public, which includes both pre-IPO and post-IPO months; thus, we only
predict stock returns several months after this financial reporting date. The
lack of readily available machine-accessible data precludes us from doing a
large sample study using strictly pre-IPO data to measure earnings man-
agement.2 Because the incentives to manage earnings are likely to persist in
the months immediately after the offering, we use accruals data from the
first public financial statement, which includes both pre- and post-IPO months,
to measure our earnings management proxy. As described in Section II, en-
trepreneurs usually cannot dispose of their personal holdings until at least
several months after the IPO. Furthermore, firms face unusual legal and
possibly reputational scrutiny in the IPO aftermath. Immediate accounting
reversals may render earnings management activities transparent enough
to trigger lawsuits against the firm and its management. Thus, issuers who
aggressively manage their pre-IPO earnings probably also manage their first
post-IPO earnings.
We relate the accruals from the first fiscal year financial statements of
the IPO firm to the stock market performance from three to six months after
the fiscal year end ~which allows investors in the market to implement our
strategy!. We focus on IPO firms’ current working capital accruals that are
unusual when compared to industry peers ~termed “discretionary”!. We find
that these discretionary current accruals are good predictors of subsequent
three-year stock return performance in a wide variety of specifications. De-
pending on benchmark specification, IPO firms that are ranked in the high-
est quartile based on IPO-year discretionary current accruals ~“aggressive”
2 Two years of data are required to calculate the accruals variables, and full pre-IPO data are
not always available. A large sample study, such as ours, would not be feasible using only
pre-IPO data, especially for the early period of our sample. Qualitatively similar results were
obtained in an earlier draft ~May 1994! using pre-IPO year data to measure earnings manage-
ment in a sample of 107 issuers.
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IPOs! earn a cumulative abnormal return of approximately 20 to 30 percent
less than the cumulative abnormal return of IPO firms ranked in the lowest
quartile ~“conservative” IPOs!. The equivalent buy-and-hold return differen-
tial between the aggressive and conservative quartiles is 15 to 30 percent.
We find that the differential performance between aggressive and conser-
vative earnings managers is robust to a battery of alternative test specifi-
cations and controls ~e.g., for market, size, book-to-market, expected return
benchmark, holding period, and cumulation method effects!. The discretion-
ary current accrual effect holds for IPOs smaller than $20 million in market
capitalization ~at the time of the first post-IPO financial statement, in dol-
lars of 1997 purchasing power!, for IPOs between $20 million and $100 mil-
lion, and for IPOs larger than $100 million. The effect is strongest in the
middle category. ~In order to minimize problems in implementing our invest-
ment strategies, most of our study considers only IPO firms with at least
$20 million dollars of market value at the first financial statement date
after the IPO.! Although the accruals effect is stronger in some years than
others, there is no clear time trend. Additional tests suggest that the ability
of accruals to predict IPO stock price underperformance derives both from a
general ability of accruals to predict returns in all firms and from an incre-
mental special ability of IPO accruals to predict returns. Moreover, the for-
mer effect ~general predictive ability of accruals! is more significant for IPO
firms because the discretionary current accruals of IPO firms are much larger
than those of average non-IPO firms. Finally, we find that managers of con-
servative IPO firms raise equity more frequently in the aftermarket. Of the
approximately 412 IPO issuers in each quartile, 170 of the conservative quar-
tile IPO firms ~compared to 152 of the aggressive quartile IPO firms! return
to the aftermarket to raise seasoned equity capital.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the
IPO process, and presents and motivates our measure of earnings manage-
ment. Section II describes the sample selection and data. Section III shows
the empirical relation between the measures of earnings management and
the post-statement long-run stock price performance. Section IV tracks the
post-IPO seasoned equity issuing activity of issuers. Section V concludes
the paper.
I. Earnings Management in Initial Public Offerings
A. The IPO Process
The IPO process is particularly susceptible to earnings management, of-
fering entrepreneurs both motivation and opportunities to manage earnings.
There is high information asymmetry between investors and issuers at the
time of the offering. Rao ~1993! reports that there is almost no news media
coverage of firms in the years before the IPO. This scarcity of information
about the issuer forces investors to rely heavily on the prospectus, which
itself may contain only one to three years of financial statements.
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If, as we hypothesize, investors are unable to understand fully the extent
to which IPO firms engage in earnings management by borrowing from ei-
ther the past or the future, high reported earnings would translate directly
into a higher offering price. But the firm also has an incentive to boost
earnings soon after the IPO to maintain a high market price. The original
entrepreneurs may wish to sell some of their personal holdings in the sec-
ondary market at the end of the lockup period. ~Entrepreneurs commit not
to sell their personal holdings during a lockup period commonly lasting
180 days or longer immediately after the IPO.! Furthermore, verbal earn-
ings projections are also made to investors during road shows at the begin-
ning of issue marketing.3 After trading begins, security analysts initiate
coverage of the firm and disseminate these earnings projections widely. To
keep the aftermarket price from dropping below the initial offer price, an-
alysts at the underwriting investment banking firms are under pressure to
make the most favorable earnings projections possible.4 In turn, the issuing
firm is under pressure to meet those projections in the aftermarket to safe-
guard its reputation for reliability; to maintain the goodwill of investors,
investment bankers, and analysts who made the initial earnings projections;
and to avoid lawsuits by disgruntled shareholders after a shortfall in post-
IPO earnings.
However, earnings are managed only if there are opportunities to do so. A
key regulatory limit on entrepreneurial discretion is a requirement that ac-
counting reports presented in the offering prospectus be audited by an ex-
ternal accounting firm to verify compliance with generally accepted accounting
principles ~GAAP!.5 The “accrual accounting system” mandated by GAAP
permits firms to make adjustments when reporting earnings. Managers are
afforded discretion in recognizing both the timing and amounts of revenues
and expenses.
These adjustments to cash f lows ~collectively called accruals! are supposed
to ref lect the underlying business condition of the firm more accurately.
Though cash f lows are the ultimate “bottom line” for valuation, many account-
3 The prospectus of U.S. IPOs does not include earnings projections due to possible legal
repercussions.
4 Recent evidence ~Ali ~1996!, Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan ~1997!, Lin and McNichols ~1997!,
Michaely and Womack ~1996!, Rajan and Servaes ~1997!, Teoh and Wong ~1997!! indicates that
analysts are overoptimistic about new issues. Some of these papers also suggest that analysts
with underwriting relationships with the issuer may be more overoptimistic than nonaffiliated
analysts. Furthermore, Teoh and Wong ~1997! provide evidence that analysts are insufficiently
skeptical about the accruals management of new issue firms but not for the general population;
the post-issue forecasts do not fully impound information in issue-year discretionary accruals
for post-issue earnings.
5 Our earnings management measure focuses on discretionary accounting choices and allows
for either GAAP-consistent or fraudulent accounting choices. Relatively few firms are caught not
complying with GAAP in the general population, and, of these, few are IPOs. Mike Maher gen-
erously provided us with the names of 159 SEC-reporting violators for the period from January
1980 to December 1985, and only six of our 485 IPO firms in this period overlapped with his
sample of violators. ~Three of these were caught within the first three years of the offering.!
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ants and market participants consider the change in cash position to be in-
adequate for conveying the underlying business condition, because they are
inf luenced by the timing of cash receipts and payments from both operations
and capital investment activities. However, when entrepreneurs have discre-
tion over the accrual adjustments, it becomes difficult for investors to assess
whether reported earnings in a given period are appropriate or misleading.6
Furthermore, the Accounting Principles Board Opinion 20 allows IPO firms
to change their accounting choices retroactively for all the financial state-
ments presented in the offering prospectus. This gives issuers exceptional
opportunities to “doctor” their time-series profile of accounting earnings for
the pre-issue fiscal years to show an increase in reported earnings.
Fear on the part of investment bankers, auditors, and entrepreneurs of
becoming targets of lawsuits can also constrain firms from managing earn-
ings. The auditor is responsible only for ensuring that the financial state-
ments are in accordance with GAAP, and not that they are the most accurate
representation of the firm’s condition. ~Auditors have been required to take
reasonable steps to detect fraud in financial statements only since 1989
with the creation of Statement of Auditing Standards 53.! Discussions with
investment bankers indicate that the underwriters’ due diligence process
generally does not include their own independent verification of the firm’s
audited financial statements. Finally, an additional constraint on earnings
management comes from reputational concerns of entrepreneurs. Evidence
in Section IV indicates that IPO firms that are more conservative in their
financial statements appear marginally more likely to return to the capital
markets for a seasoned equity offering. Thus, an enhanced ability to raise
capital in the future could be either a direct or an indirect benefit to firms
that manage their IPO earnings conservatively.
B. Measures of Earnings Management
Reported earnings consist of cash f lows from operations and accounting
adjustments called accruals. We first decompose total accruals into current
and long-term components. We evaluate these two components separately
because entrepreneurs have more discretion over short-term than over long-
term accruals ~see, e.g., Guenther ~1994!!. Current accrual adjustments in-
volve short-term assets and liabilities that support the day-to-day operations
of the firm. Managers can increase current accruals, for example, by advanc-
ing recognition of revenues with credit sales ~before cash is received!, by
delaying recognition of expenses through assumption of a low provision for
bad debts, or by deferring recognition of expenses when cash is advanced to
suppliers. Long-term accrual adjustments, which involve long-term net as-
6 For example, firms that ship products can recognize sales revenues, even if the cash pay-
ments can be delayed or if the product can be returned. Appendix B gives examples of how
firms can affect reported income in detail. For the reader interested in examining a particular
firm in more detail, Welch ~1997! discusses one IPO firm in the apparel business that had
unusually high accruals.
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sets, can be increased by decelerating depreciation, decreasing deferred taxes
~the difference between tax expense recognized for financial reporting and
actual taxes paid!, or realizing unusual gains.
Not surprisingly, firms are not eager to publicize accrual adjustments that
ref lect their desire for a higher short-term share price rather than the eco-
nomic realities of the mismatch between actual accounting events and the
timing of inf lows and outf lows. Thus, it is difficult for investors to infer how
much of the accruals are discretionary ~i.e., unusual managerial choices given
the underlying timing of cash f lows!. Given the business conditions typically
faced by the firm in the industry, some accrual adjustments are appropriate
and necessary, and so are expected by investors. For example, fixed-asset-
intensive firms have high depreciation, or rapidly growing firms may have
revenues that exceed cash sales. Thus, we need a model to decompose ac-
cruals into two components, one that is dictated by firm and industry con-
ditions and one that is presumed to be managed by the entrepreneur.
Following Teoh, Wong, and Rao ~1998!, we use an extension of the cross-
sectional Jones ~1991! model for this purpose. The details of the procedure
are described in Appendix A. In essence, current accruals ~CA! are regressed
on the change in sales in a cross-sectional regression using all firms in the
same two-digit SIC code as the issuer, but excluding the issuer and other
firms issuing IPO or seasoned equities within two years of the issuer.7
The cross-sectional regression is performed each fiscal year, and all vari-
ables are scaled by lagged firm assets. The fitted current accruals of the
issuer are calculated using the estimated coefficients from the regression
and the change in sales net of the change in trade receivables. The change in
trade receivables is subtracted from the change in sales to allow for the
possibility of sales manipulation.8 The fitted current accruals are considered
to be the level necessary to support the firm’s sales increase and is termed
nondiscretionary current accruals ~NDCA!. The regression residual is pre-
sumed not dictated by firm and industry conditions and is considered to
have been “managed,” and so is termed discretionary current accruals ~DCA!.
The cross-sectional approach automatically adjusts for the effects of f luctu-
ating industry-wide economic conditions that inf luence accruals indepen-
dent of any earnings management in each year.9 An equivalent procedure, in
7 We exclude seasoned equity issuers in the industry Jones model regression when estimat-
ing discretionary accruals because Teoh, Welch, and Wong ~1998! report earnings management
prior to seasoned equity issues. An earlier version ~using IPOs from 1980 through 1989! ex-
cluded only the issuer and found similar results. Also, the correlation of discretionary current
accruals obtained when excluding SEOs within two years of the issuer and when just excluding
contemporaneous SEO issuers is 99.9 percent.
8 In other words, any sales increase that results in an increase in trade receivables is con-
sidered discretionary.
9 Investment bankers also price IPOs relative to “comparable companies” in cross section.
The alternative time-series approach is infeasible because IPO firms do not have a long history
of financial statement data. Kim and Ritter ~1998! investigate this relative IPO pricing in more
detail.
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which total accruals are related to the change in sales as well as property,
plant, and equipment ~to adjust for depreciation! yields a decomposition into
discretionary and nondiscretionary total accruals. The difference between
discretionary total accruals and discretionary current accruals is termed dis-
cretionary long-term accruals ~DLA!, and the difference between nondiscre-
tionary total accruals and nondiscretionary current accruals is termed
nondiscretionary long-term accruals ~NDLA!.
To summarize, accruals are decomposed into four components: discretion-
ary and nondiscretionary current accruals, and discretionary and nondiscre-
tionary long-term accruals. Nondiscretionary accruals are the asset-scaled
proxies for unmanipulated accruals dictated by business conditions. Discre-
tionary accruals are the asset-scaled proxies for manipulated earnings de-
termined at the discretion of management.10 Given the earlier discussion,
we expect that discretionary current accruals ~DCA! are the superior proxy
for earnings management.
C. Stock Prices and Earnings Management
Our hypothesis that accounting accruals predict post-IPO stock return un-
derperformance requires the presence of both earnings management and in-
vestor credulity. The presence of earnings management alone does not
necessarily imply that IPOs are overvalued in the aftermarket. On average,
negative post-IPO abnormal stock returns would not be observed if the post-
IPO stock market were fully efficient and we had the right model for ex-
pected returns. Investors would adequately discount the stock price to ref lect
earnings management observable from public information sources, and so-
phisticated short-selling would drive aftermarket prices quickly to an ap-
propriate level. Our hypothesis is that the marginal investor does not rationally
discount for earnings management in forming expectations about future cash
f lows. Ultimately, if the IPO underperformance is not merely an ex post
chance event ~and international and other evidence suggest it is not!, it is
unlikely that any fully rational theory will be able to explain why some
rational investors are willing to hold IPOs in the aftermarket. Returns for
what are likely to be risky and illiquid investments are simply too low to be
explained by known equilibrium models. Our own evidence is consistent with
a stock market for IPO firms that uses some, but not all, of the earnings
information available in the financial statements. Furthermore, our evi-
dence is consistent with managers adjusting accruals to exploit market cre-
dulity, but it does not prove that managers intentionally do so.
10 High discretionary accruals may result from opportunistic overoptimistic misrepresenta-
tion of the firm’s potential cash f lows to inf luence investors, from unintentional overoptimism
by the managers about future cash f lows, or from timing of high accruals that the managers
exploit by taking the firm public at this juncture. ~We minimize the inf luence of the last effect
by measuring discretionary accruals relative to industry peers who are likely to face similar
business conditions.!
Earnings Management of IPOs 1941
II. Sample Selection and Data
The initial sample of domestic U.S. initial public offerings consists of 1,974
IPOs ~provided to us by Chris James and Jay Ritter! for the 1980 to 1984
period, and 3,197 IPOs ~obtained from Securities Data Co. ~SDC!! for the
1985 to 1992 period. For inclusion in the final sample, IPOs must have
available COMPUSTAT financial data both in the year of and the year prior
to the offering, CRSP stock return data ~at least one-month’s return must be
available during the three-year period beyond three months after the first
fiscal year-end!, an offer price exceeding one dollar, and a market capital-
ization of at least $20 million in December 1997 purchasing power. These
selection criteria yield a final sample size of 1,649 IPO firms. No closed-end
funds ~SIC code 6726! are in our final sample.
Figure 1 illustrates our timing convention. The fiscal year in which the
IPO occurs is year 0. Thus, fiscal year 21 ends before the date of the IPO,
and fiscal year 0 includes both pre- and post-IPO information. Our financial
statement information ~e.g., discretionary current accruals, and our market
capitalization screen of $20 million! is taken from fiscal year 0. As discussed
earlier, IPO firms have an incentive to manage both pre-and immediate post-
IPO earnings. To allow for a reporting lag, aftermarket returns are calcu-
lated beginning three to six months ~varying across specifications! after the
fiscal year 0 ends. Thus, the accruals information necessary to compute our
earnings management measure is available prior to the return cumulation
period. This data availability constraint on the accruals forces us to examine
post-issue returns beginning three to fifteen months later than the return
period in other studies, which measure the post-issue stock return perfor-
mance beginning after the first-day return on the issue.
Table I provides descriptive statistics for the 1,649 IPO firms in our sam-
ple. The presence of sixty-four separate two-digit SIC codes, with forty-two
of these representing at least 1 percent of the sample ~sixteen IPOs!, indi-
cates a wide selection of industries. Not surprisingly for our sample period,
there is a concentration of IPOs in the computer and electronics industries.
There is a sizeable number of IPOs in each sample year, but 1983, 1986,
1987, 1991, and 1992 are higher volume years. Oil and gas IPOs in our
sample went public primarily in the first two years of our sample—declining
Figure 1. Time line.
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oil prices in the 1980s reduced the f low of oil and gas IPOs. The sample
characteristics are generally similar to those reported by Loughran and Rit-
ter ~1995!, although the earlier years are undersampled due to increasing
COMPUSTAT coverage of small firms over time.
Panels C and D report the IPO and immediate post-IPO characteristics
that are used as control variables in our cross-sectional regression. The mean
market capitalization is about $200 million but the median is only $66 mil-
lion, both about two and one-half to three times the post-issue book values.
The mean and median total assets are $277 million and $40 million, respec-
tively. IPO firms experience large increases in sales as a percentage of total
assets in year 21 ~mean 80 percent, median 46 percent!, two to three times
the equivalent number for the average COMPUSTAT firm. The asset-scaled
sales change is a key variable in the regression to estimate discretionary
accruals. IPO firms are generally young firms, having existed for a mean of
thirteen years and a median of seven years before going public.11 The offer-
ing prices average about $12.30 per share ~median $11.50!, and our sample
IPOs are underpriced, on average, by 7 percent ~median 1.6 percent!. The
mean ~median! book-to-market ratio is 30 ~40! percent, and earnings per
share are 3 to 4 percent of the share price. In sum, our sample is represen-
tative of IPO firms in the sample period.
Table II, Panel A, reports the time-series distribution from the issue year
to six years after for our key measure of earnings management, discretion-
ary current accruals ~DCA!, and for two accounting performance measures,
net income and cash f low from operations as a percentage of lagged total
assets. The median discretionary current accruals decline monotonically over
time from a significant positive 4.0 percent of beginning assets in the IPO
year to a level insignificantly different from zero by year 3. They then be-
come significantly negative by year 5 and remain negative, though insigni-
ficant, in year 6.12 The time series pattern of mean accruals exhibits a similar
peak in the issue year and a subsequent steady decline ~the numbers are not
reported in the table!. The time series patterns of industry-adjusted net
income and cash f low from operations also hint at earnings management.
The median net income is significantly positive in year 0 and then declines
monotonically to be significantly negative by year 4. The cash f low from
operations begins poorly in the issuance year and monotonically improves
through year 6. These patterns are consistent with managers advancing ac-
cruals to increase reported net income in the issuance period. Subsequently,
11 We found age data for 1,601 IPOs from various sources: Jay Ritter for the early sample
period, 1980 to 1984, and Securities Data Co., EDGAR and LEXIS online services, Moody’s
Handbook of Common Stocks, and Ward’s Business Directory of US Private and Public Compa-
nies for IPOs from 1985 to 1992. Age is calculated as the number of years between IPO date and
either the founding date or incorporation date, whichever is the earlier.
12 We do not have data for year 6 for 1991 IPOs nor for years 5 and 6 for 1992 IPOs. The
sample sizes are therefore smaller in years 5 and 6. Moreover, poorer post-IPO performers are
more likely to disappear in the later years because they may go out of business, merge, or be
taken over. Because relatively more firms merge when in distress, the reported post-issue data
may understate the true decline in accruals.
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Table I
Sample Characteristics
The sample consists of 1,649 domestic IPO firms going public in the period from 1980–1992 with an offering price of at least $1 and a market
capitalization of $20 million in 1997 prices ~in year 0!. The sample firms must also have at least one-month post-issue stock return from CRSP
beyond three months after fiscal year 0 ~the fiscal year containing the issue date! and sufficient COMPUSTAT data to calculate four components
of accruals in fiscal year 0 ~see Appendix A for required data items!. The distribution of the sample is reported in Panel A by two-digit SIC code,
and in Panel B by IPO calendar year. Panel C characteristics of market value, book value of equity, total assets, and ratios D Sales ~sales
change0lagged assets!, B0M ~book value0market value!, and E0P ~earnings0price! are measured at the end of fiscal year 0. The change in sales
is from year 21 to year 0 scaled by assets in year 21. Panel D characteristics are measured at the time of the IPO. Age is the number of years
between the founding year or incorporation date ~whichever is earlier! and the IPO year.
Panel A: SIC Distribution
Industry Two-digit SIC Codes Freq. %
Oil and Gas 13, 29 48 2.9
Food Products 20 23 1.4
Paper and Paper Products 24–27 43 2.6
Chemical Products 28 140 8.5
Manufacturing 30–34 61 3.7
Computer Hardware & Software 35, 73 367 22.3
Electronic Equipment 36 149 9.0
Transportation 37, 39, 40–42, 44, 45 82 5.0
Scientific Instruments 38 130 7.9
Communications 48 41 2.5
Electric and Gas Services 49 16 1.0
Durable Goods 50 45 2.7
Retail 53, 54, 56, 57, 59 135 8.2
Eating and Drinking Establishments 58 40 2.4
Financial Services 61, 62, 64, 65 53 3.2
Entertainment Services 70, 78, 79 22 1.3
Health 80 85 5.2
All others 1, 7, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 46, 47, 51,
















Panel B: Time Distribution
Fiscal Year-End Freq. % Cum. Freq. %
1980 45 2.7 45 2.7
1981 102 6.2 147 8.9
1982 36 2.2 183 11.1
1983 192 11.6 375 22.7
1984 66 4.0 441 26.7
1985 88 5.3 529 32.1
1986 214 13.0 743 45.1
1987 148 9.0 891 54.0
1988 74 4.5 965 58.5
1989 61 3.7 1,026 62.2
1990 76 4.6 1,102 66.8
1991 232 14.1 1,334 80.9
1992 315 19.1 1,649 100.0
Total 1,649 100.0%










Mean 199.68 78.68 276.85 80.47 0.400 0.032
Median 66.23 23.06 39.78 46.30 0.336 0.042








Mean 13.05 12.30 7.12
















Time-Series and Cross-sectional Characteristics of Discretionary
Current Accruals, the Proxy for Earnings Management
The sample consists of 1,649 domestic IPO firms going public in the period from 1980 to 1992 with an offering price of at least
$1 and a market capitalization of $20 million in 1997 prices ~in year 0!. Panel A reports time-series statistics on DCA and two
accounting performance measures, net income and cash f low from operations, in percentage of lagged total assets. The account-
ing performance measures are relative to their two-digit industry medians, e.g., NIi, t 0TAi, t21 2 NIt 0TAt21, where i indicates the
firm and overlined variables are industry medians, and TA is total assets. Reported net income consists of total accruals and cash
f lows from operations ~CFO!. Accruals consist of current ~working-capital! accruals ~CA!, the change in noncash current assets
minus the change in current liabilities, and long-term accruals ~LA!. Discretionary current accruals ~DCA! are extracted from
current accruals by a within two-digit SIC industry cross-sectional modified Jones ~1991! model. ~See Appendix A for details of
the discretionary accruals model regressions and COMPUSTAT data items for calculating accruals.! DCA measures the amount
of earnings management. All accrual variables and performance measures in Panels A and B are scaled by lagged total assets and
are reported as a percentage of lagged assets. p-values for the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests in Panel A are two-tailed. Because our
COMPUSTAT data end in 1996, 1991 IPOs are included with only five years of data, and 1992 IPOs with only four years of data.
Panel B reports summary statistics by issue year DCA quartile for: discretionary current accruals ~always scaled by lagged
assets!, inf lation-adjusted market capitalization ~MV* !, book-to-market ~B0M!, earnings-to-price ~E0P!, and net income














Panel A: Time-Series Distribution of Accruals and Accounting Performance ~as a percentage of total assets in the prior year!
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Discretionary current accruals ~DCA!
Median 4.01 2.24 0.98 0.14 0.09 20.51 20.70
p~sign-rank! 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.089 0.512 0.023 0.695
N 1,649 1,591 1,483 1,372 1,254 943 736
Industry-adjusted net income
Median 7.82 3.67 1.45 0.23 20.24 0.18 0.42
p~sign-rank! 0.000 0.000 0.402 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.276
N 1,649 1,592 1,485 1,377 1,256 947 739
Industry-adjusted cash f lows
Median 24.83 22.42 20.99 20.94 20.20 0.33 1.18
p~sign-rank! 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.126 0.252 0.018
N 1,647 1,588 1,484 1,371 1,254 944 738



















Conservative Q1 ~DCA , 25.0%! 412 214.93 224.33 29.54 96.16 31.05 4.38 14.75
Quartile 2 ~25.0% , DCA , 4.0%! 412 20.12 20.16 2.42 126.49 38.91 4.44 7.44
Quartile 3 ~4.0% , DCA , 18.5%! 413 10.10 10.38 4.20 80.52 34.20 4.46 10.82
Aggressive Q4 ~DCA . 18.5%! 412 39.76 53.92 41.98 65.96 30.60 3.89 17.27















even though the median cash f low from operations actually improves every
year, the decline in post-issue accruals causes a post-IPO decline in earn-
ings. These results are consistent with Teoh, Wong, and Rao ~1998!, who
show that these patterns are robust with respect to alternative earnings
management and income performance measures.
At various points throughout the paper, we rely on a quartile classifica-
tion of firms to avoid the linear parameterization of regressions. We sort the
1,649 IPO firms by their asset-scaled discretionary accruals into four quar-
tiles, containing either 412 or 413 IPOs. We label the quartile of IPO firms
with the lowest discretionary current accruals as “conservative” IPOs and
the quartile of IPOs with the highest discretionary current accruals as “ag-
gressive” IPOs. ~Higher accruals increase reported earnings.! The conserva-
tive quartile has discretionary current accruals of less than 25 percent, the
second quartile has accruals of 25 percent to 14 percent, the third quartile
has accruals of 4 percent to 18.5 percent, and the aggressive quartile has
accruals exceeding 18.5 percent.
Panel B reports sample characteristics within these quartiles. There is
considerably higher cross-sectional variation within the conservative ~29.5
percent! and aggressive quartiles ~42.0 percent! than within the two middle
quartiles. The overall sample standard deviation is 38.3 percent. The two
quartiles with the lowest discretionary accruals contain larger firms than
the two more aggressive quartiles, although this relation is not monotonic
across the four quartiles. In contrast, there are no visible systematic pat-
terns between accrual quartiles and book-to-market ratio, earnings-to-price
ratio, or net income scaled by lagged assets.
We also examine the intertemporal variation in discretionary current ac-
cruals ~the results are not reported in the table!. We find that discretionary
current accruals decline from the earlier half of the sample ~pre-1987: me-
dian 5.4 percent, mean 13.1 percent! to the latter half ~post-1987: median
3.1 percent, mean 7.8 percent!. However, this decline over time is small com-
pared to the within-period across-firms variation ~the standard deviation of
DCA is 36.4 percent pre-1987 and 39.4 percent post-1987!. Furthermore, we
find that the median ~mean! discretionary current accruals is 3.1 percent
~8.3 percent! of lagged assets in high issue volume years and 6.3 percent
~13.4 percent! during other years. ~Perhaps IPO investors pay less attention
to post-IPO earnings when they are busy investing in other IPOs, easing the
pressure for firms to manage earnings during high volume periods.! Again,
this year-by-year variation is swamped by the 38 percent cross-sectional stan-
dard deviation in discretionary current accruals. Thus, the accruals effect
that we document is not likely to be a mere period-specific effect.
III. Empirical Results
Our key objective is to evaluate the extent to which managed accruals
have an inf luence on the long-run abnormal stock return performance of
IPO firms. This requires an appropriate measure for expected long-run re-
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turns, an issue much debated in the asset pricing literature. We adopt an
agnostic approach, and consider alternative measures of computing abnor-
mal returns ~buy-and-hold and cumulative abnormal returns!, benchmarks
~raw, market-adjusted, Fama–French ~1993! adjusted, matching firms ad-
justed!, cumulation periods, sample partitions, and regression test specifi-
cations ~cross-sectional, time-series, and Fama–MacBeth ~1973! type
regressions!. All tests indicate that discretionary current accruals reliably
predict post-IPO returns.
A. Distribution of Stock Returns by DCA Quartiles
Many studies on long-run performance report buy-and-hold returns ~BH!,
because they are most relevant for an investor. But Fama ~1998! raises a set
of concerns about the use of BH returns in long-run performance studies. In
particular, buy-and-hold returns are problematic because their distribution
is skewed, small initial differences can be exaggerated through compound-
ing, and time-period overlap introduces cross-correlation problems.13 There-
fore, we report both CAR and BH portfolio returns. Fama ~1998! further
points out that long-horizon inference can be sensitive to equilibrium ex-
pected return model specifications.14
Given the controversy about the acceptable measure for long-run perfor-
mance, Panel A in Table III reports abnormal long-run returns using a va-
riety of benchmarks. We do not report the middle quartiles both for space
reasons and because quartile returns are generally monotonic. On a CAR
measure, the aggressive accruals portfolio underperforms the conservative
accruals portfolio by 21.6 percent in raw returns, 26.2 percent in CRSP value-
weighted market-adjusted returns, and 25.4 percent in Nasdaq composite
index-adjusted returns. On a BH measure, the underperformance is some-
what larger ~24.9 percent in raw returns, 30.7 percent in CRSP market-
adjusted returns, and 29.2 percent in Nasdaq-adjusted returns!.
The fourth row in Panel A shows adjusted returns using the Fama and
French ~1993! benchmark. For each firm, returns are constrained to be
Rt 5 rft 1 g1 ~Mt 2 rft ! 1 g2 SMBt 1 g3 HMLt 1 ARt , ~1!
13 BH and CAR standard errors are computed from the time-series of months rather than
from the cross section of firms. The same month’s returns for different firms enter into different
event months, which could violate the uncorrelatedness assumption in time series. This prob-
lem can be addressed, for example, with a Fama and MacBeth ~1973! procedure. Of course, if
the equilibrium model is misspecified, even CAR standard errors, computed from the time
eries, are not correct.
14 Fama ~1998! also criticizes long-run performance studies with no directional predictions.
He notes that half of all studies seem to find underperformance, half overperformance. Our
earnings management hypothesis is directional, applies both to seasoned and initial public
offerings, and is present in both contexts ~see Teoh, Welch, and Wong ~1998! for the evidence on
SEOs!.
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Table III
Long-Horizon Mean Abnormal Returns (in percent) by Issue Year DCA Quartiles Using
Alternative Benchmarks, Reporting Lags, and Sample Partitions.
The sample consists of 1,649 domestic IPO firms going public in the period from 1980–1992 with an offering price of at least $1 and a market
capitalization of $20 million in 1997 prices ~in year 0!. The benchmark for expected returns is the value-weighted market index in all panels except
when noted otherwise in Panel A. The holding period is five to forty months after the release of the first post-IPO financial statements in all panels
except when noted otherwise in Panel B. Quartile 1 firms are most conservative, quartile 4 most aggressive, in the amount of earnings management
of the first post-IPO financial statements. The proxy for earnings management ~discretionary current accruals, DCA! is described in Table II, and
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~when sample firm returns are missing, both ri, t and mi, t are set to zero!, are statistics computed from the cross section of multimonth returns net
of multimonth benchmark returns. Their t-statistics have information on “bad” versus “good” firms. ~Due to cross-sectional correlation problems, the
latter t-statistics should not be translated into p values.!
Panel A: Benchmark Variations
Cumulative Abnormal ~%! Buy-and-Hold ~%!
Return N All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Raw retuns 1,649 25.3 31.1 35.4 25.2 9.5 32.2 38.9 40.7 35.1 14.0
~t-stat! ~3.77! ~3.58! ~4.39! ~3.60! ~0.99! ~8.45! ~5.53! ~5.94! ~3.93! ~1.88!
Market-adj. 1,649 218.9 212.0 27.8 218.0 238.2 215.6 27.2 26.1 211.2 237.9














Market-adj. 1,649 213.2 25.2 24.3 213.0 230.6 27.3 2.4 20.7 24.1 226.8
Nasdaq Comp. Ind. ~t-stat! ~22.62! ~20.71! ~20.71! ~21.94! ~24.24! ~21.95! ~0.35! ~20.10! ~20.46! ~23.69!
Fama–French adj. 1,649 212.1 27.4 22.6 212.3 226.4 26.3 0.7 2.0 24.7 223.2
~t-stat! ~22.56! ~20.99! ~20.50! ~22.01! ~23.55! ~21.78! ~0.11! ~0.31! ~20.56! ~23.34!
Matching firm adj. 1,649 28.7 22.0 227.5 0.5 13.5 225.0
~t-stat! ~22.35! ~20.29! ~23.60! ~0.11! ~1.62! ~22.39!
Panel B: Holding Period Variations, Value-Weighted Market-Adjusted Benchmark
Sooner 1,649 221.4 212.1 210.6 220.6 242.8 218.3 25.7 29.4 217.0 241.0
13 . . .138 ~t-stat! ~24.74! ~21.67! ~21.84! ~23.77! ~25.55! ~25.13! ~20.82! ~21.47! ~22.20! ~25.64!
Later 1,649 217.4 211.6 25.7 216.2 236.5 214.6 26.7 25.5 210.8 235.4
17 . . . 42 ~t-stat! ~23.39! ~21.53! ~20.90! ~22.75! ~24.52! ~23.72! ~20.90! ~20.85! ~21.21! ~24.24!
Longer* 1,649 222.6 211.8 27.9 223.6 247.6 221.1 27.0 26.7 214.4 256.1
15 . . .152 ~t-stat! ~23.92! ~21.47! ~21.01! ~23.16! ~24.96! ~24.14! ~20.72! ~20.61! ~21.22! ~27.61!
Panel C: Sample Partitions, Value-Weighted Market Adjusted Benchmark
By firm size in real 1997 dollars
Tiny firms* 509 218.9 221.8 27.7 218.6 228.1 231.6 217.3 228.5 231.6 248.7
,$20m ~t-stat! ~22.23! ~21.64! ~20.44! ~21.23! ~22.00! ~24.91! ~21.14! ~22.29! ~22.62! ~24.22!
Medium-size firms 888 225.2 217.6 211.4 221.5 244.1 221.9 24.6 211.8 214.0 249.4
$20m to $100m ~t-stat! ~24.01! ~21.81! ~21.30! ~23.26! ~24.37! ~24.10! ~20.42! ~21.03! ~21.13! ~26.18!
Large firms 761 211.6 25.8 25.0 213.7 227.4 28.2 210.0 21.8 27.7 216.8
.$100m ~t-stat! ~22.43! ~20.69! ~20.82! ~22.22! ~22.76! ~21.55! ~21.21! ~20.22! ~20.61! ~21.14!
By book-to-market ratio
“Growth” 817 223.4 214.7 25.1 214.7 254.5 216.2 215.5 22.2 20.9 240.9
,0.3 ~t-stat! ~23.92! ~22.08! ~20.57! ~21.79! ~24.92! ~22.76! ~21.83! ~20.22! ~20.06! ~23.56!
“Value” 832 214.5 28.9 29.6 220.9 218.9 214.9 2.9 28.8 220.5 234.2
.0.3 ~t-stat! ~22.66! ~20.87! ~21.52! ~23.05! ~21.97! ~23.13! ~0.26! ~20.96! ~22.30! ~24.00!
By subperiods
First half 662 234.7 231.7 220.1 231.9 249.6 240.1 226.9 226.7 242.9 257.8
1980 to 1986 ~t-stat! ~25.01! ~23.55! ~22.29! ~23.41! ~24.42! ~29.41! ~22.93! ~23.33! ~26.36! ~26.41!
Second half 987 28.5 20.0 21.2 29.9 226.9 0.8 5.1 5.0 8.8 219.0
1987 to 1992 ~t-stat! ~21.38! ~20.00! ~20.14! ~21.44! ~22.54! ~0.15! ~0.54! ~0.53! ~0.64! ~21.67!















where t is an event month index, Rt is the raw return for one firm, rft is the
risk-free rate, Mt is the value-weighted market return, SMBt is the return
difference between a portfolio of small and a portfolio of large firms, and
HMLt is the return difference between a portfolio of high book-to-market
and a portfolio of low book-to-market firms.15
Both the returns and exposure coefficients for IPO firms may be unreli-
able because 8 percent of the firms disappear within 36 months. When there
are fewer than twelve monthly return observations—too few to reliably es-
timate gamma coefficients—we compute abnormal return ~AR! as a market-
adjusted return ~ARi, t 5 vRi, t 2 Mi, t! instead of the Fama–French abnormal
return ~from equation ~1!! for this particular firm. The Fama–French pro-
cedure suggests a smaller underperformance differential of 19.0 percent on
a CAR basis and 23.9 percent on a BH basis.
The fifth row of Panel A adjusts returns using a set of matched firms as
benchmark. Following Ritter’s ~1991! procedure, each IPO firm is matched
with a nonissuing firm from CRSP based on industry membership and mar-
ket capitalization. ~Firms issuing seasoned equity are included as potential
matches.! If the original matched firm drops out before the IPO firm, the
next best match as of the original match date is spliced in for the remainder
of the cumulation period to avoid survivorship bias in the matched sample.
If the sample firm drops out, both sample and matching firms are assigned
zero returns for the remainder of the period. Barber and Lyon ~1997! report
that this procedure is reasonably reliable. The matched-firm benchmark sug-
gests a performance differential between aggressive and conservative ac-
cruers of 25.5 percent on a CAR measure and 38.5 percent on a BH measure.
In sum, the long-run performance differential between aggressive and con-
servative earnings managers seems large and economically significant re-
gardless of the benchmark used.
For brevity, the remainder of Table III reports only the value-weighted
market-adjusted returns. Panel B shows that varying the starting months
by either 12 or 22 months does not substantially impact our results. Nei-
ther variation changes the conclusions. The third row extends the holding
period from three to four years. Conservative quartile firms have stabilized
after three years ~as have the unreported quartiles 2 and 3!, but the aggres-
sive quartile firms continue to deteriorate another 11.1 percent in CAR terms,
and 20.7 percent in BH terms in the fourth year. ~We do not use four-year
returns elsewhere in the paper.!
Panel C considers sample partitions by size, book-to-market ratios, and
time-period. The size partition is based on market capitalization measured
at the time of the first financial statement post-IPO with cutoffs at $20
million and $100 million ~in December 1997 real dollars!. The differential in
returns between aggressive and conservative quartiles is apparent within
all size subgroups. The 509 small firms ~,$20m! have the smallest CAR
differential ~6.3 percent; BH 5 31.4 percent!; the 761 large firms ~.$100m!
15 Gene Fama and Ken French generously provided us with their factor returns.
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have the smallest BH differential ~6.8 percent;16 CAR 5 21.6 percent!. The
largest differentials between aggressive and conservative firms ~illustrating
the strongest accruals effect! occur in the 888 middle-sized firms: 26.5 per-
cent in CAR terms and 44.8 percent in BH terms. ~Within-size quartile dif-
ferences are explored further in Appendix C, Table AI.!
The next partition by market-to-book ratio uses a cutoff of 30 percent.
Again, in both subsamples, aggressive firms underperform conservative firms.
There is no distinct pattern in whether value firms or growth firms display
a greater differential. The final sample partition ~by time period! shows that
the aggressive versus conservative stock return differential increases from
17.9 percent pre-1987 to 26.9 percent post-1987 on a CAR basis. On a BH
basis, the differential decreases from 30.9 percent pre-1987 to 24.1 percent
post-1987. More detailed ~unreported! investigations show that the differen-
tial is strong in seven of twelve years ~including 1992!, weak in four years
~including 1990 and 1991!, and reverses in 1988 when there were relatively
few IPOs following the 1987 stock market crash. The small number of ob-
servations per year renders definite statements about time trends in the
effect of discretionary accruals on later returns unreliable.
In sum, even if inferences on the magnitude of IPO long-run underperfor-
mance are sensitive to the abnormal return computation, the difference in
performance between firms employing different degrees of earnings man-
agement is not. More conservative firms outperform more aggressive firms
by a margin that is economically significant.
Figure 2 plots the time series of buy-and-hold returns of the four quartile
portfolios ~plus the overall average! net of the Nasdaq composite index bench-
mark buy-and-hold returns. The figure shows that IPO firms in the conser-
vative first quartile outperform the Nasdaq market by about 4 percent over
three years, whereas the aggressive fourth quartile IPO firms underperform
by about 25 percent. ~Composed of many new IPOs and small firms itself,
the Nasdaq index performed relatively poorly throughout the sample period,
so the magnitude of IPO underperformance indicated by this benchmark is
relatively conservative. As noted previously, our focus is on explaining the
cross-sectional variation in the underperformance with our accruals mea-
sure, and not on the magnitude of the underperformance per se. The cumu-
lated returns of the aggressive and conservative quartiles display a different
drift if another benchmark is used, but the return differential itself is robust
with respect to alternative benchmarks.! The figure also shows that noncon-
servative portfolios deteriorate in the first twelve months, with the aggres-
sive quartile 4 portfolio ~and then the quartile 3 portfolio! performing worst.
During the years thereafter, the nonaggressive portfolios show only a small
drift, but the most aggressive quartile 4 portfolio enjoys only a six-month
reprieve before resuming its dramatic decline.
16 The unreported next conservative quartile 2 shows a BH underperformance of 1.8 percent,
the unreported next aggressive quartile 3 shows a BH underperformance of 7.7 percent. We do
not use these smallest firms elsewhere in the paper.
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B. Event-Time Cross-Sectional Regressions
To examine the incremental inf luence of the accrual variables on post-
issue stock return underperformance, we add the four accrual variables to
the regression in Ritter ~1991, Table X!. The IPO three-year post-issue buy-
and-hold returns are regressed on the four accrual variables and a set of
control variables for other known potential predictors in one cross-sectional
regression. The control variables are year-dummies ~coefficients are not re-
ported; these subsume the year-issuing-volume measure in Ritter ~1991!!; a
contemporaneous three-year value-weighted buy-and-hold market return from
the exchange that listed the IPO ~MktRet!; the IPO firm’s logged capitaliza-
tion at December 1997 prices ~MV* ! and logged book-to-market ratio ~BV0
MV!; the IPO first-day underpricing return ~Underpr!; one high-tech ~HiTech!
and one oil&gas ~Oil&Gas! industry dummy; one plus the log of the firm’s
age ~AGE!; lagged asset-scaled mean capital expenditure, D CapExp, mea-
Figure 2. Cumulative buy-and-hold return net of Nasdaq composite index return of
DCA quartiles by event month, in percent. The sample is of 1,649 IPOs from the 1980–92
period. ~Details are described in Table I.! Firms are divided into quartiles based on how ag-
gressively they manage their earnings. Our measure of earnings management is the firm’s
discretionary current accruals ~DCA!, which adjusts for industry, size, and growth. Details are
described in Table II and Section I.B.
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sured as asset-scaled mean capital expenditures in years 1, 2, and 3 less the
asset-scaled mean capital expenditure in years 21 and 0; and the asset-
scaled net income growth, D NetIncome in the IPO year.17 Although such
regressions ignore the contemporaneous correlations among variables, and
can lead to biased standard errors ~but not biased coefficient estimates!,
Ritter’s results have been supported in other studies. Furthermore, this spec-
ification provides regression coefficients that allow an easy interpretation of
the economic significance. The estimated regression is




2 0.227**{DCAi 1 0.053{DLAi 2 0.241{NDCAi 2 0.004{NDLAi
1 1.000***{MktReti 1 0.020{log~MV* !i 1 0.264{log~BV0MV!i
1 0.020{Underpri 2 0.717***{Oil&Gasi 1 0.095{HiTechi
1 0.007{log~1 1 AGE !i 1 1.124***{DCapExpi
1 0.217***{DNetIncomei 1 ei , ~2!
where Ri is the three-year post-issue buy-and-hold return calculated start-
ing four months after the first fiscal year-end, and the independent vari-
ables include the four accruals and controls. Three stars denote significance
at the 1 percent level ~if residuals are uncorrelated!. The regression statis-
tics show that the regression is adequately specified. The F-statistic for re-
gression fit is highly significant, the adjusted R-square of the regression is
6.37 percent, and the chi-square test indicates no significant heteroskedas-
ticity in the regression residuals.
The key variable, discretionary current accruals ~DCA!, has a signifi-
cantly negative estimated coefficient of 20.227 ~ p-value 0.03!, indicating
that firms with high earnings management proxy to boost earnings in the
year of the IPO subsequently show greater underperformance. With a mean
~median! discretionary current accrual spread of about 78 percent ~55 per-
cent! between quartiles 1 and 4, the estimated coefficient on DCA implies a
return difference of 17.7 percent ~12.5 percent using the median! between
the extreme quartiles. The estimated DCA coefficient increases when the
regression specification is estimated without extreme observations of DCA
~not reported!. For example, truncating the sample at the 1st and 99th per-
17 D CapExp, which controls for Cheng’s ~1995! documented mean effect, shows strong sig-
nificance in our IPO sample, perhaps because it is measured using post-issue data and so has
a large timing advantage relative to the other variables. D NetIncome measures the incremen-
tal effect of the accrual variables over an income growth variable. Thus, significance of the
accrual variables suggests that investors are credulous with respect to the accruals component
and not just merely to income growth.
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centiles increases the estimated DCA coefficient to 20.573 ~ p-value 0.000,
t-statistic of 24.008!. Thus, a one-standard deviation increase in DCA ~about
28.8 percent in the truncated sample! implies a 16.5 percent return difference.
Finally, among the four accrual variables, only the DCA variable is consis-
tently robust across a variety of alternative regression specifications.18
C. Time-Series Regressions Using Book-to-Market and
Market Capitalization Adjusted Returns
We vary the test specification in this subsection by using a calendar time-
series approach ~shown to be reliable for random samples by Lyon, Barber,
and Tsai ~1998!! and a novel portfolio membership selection procedure that
controls for size and book-to-market effects. We construct two portfolios that
differ in their discretionary current accruals, but not in their size and book-
to-market characteristics. We then compare their estimated intercepts in a
regression of portfolio returns on the Fama–French ~1993! three-factor re-
turns in Table IV,
Rpt 2 Rft 5 a 1 b{~Rmt 2 Rft ! 1 s{SMBt 1 h{HMLt 1 et , ~3!
where t is a calendar ~not event!! month index; Rpt is the relevant conserva-
tive or aggressive DCA portfolio return adjusted for size and book-to-market
differences to be explained below; Rmt is the return on the value-weighted
CRSP index; Rft is the beginning-of-month three-month T-bill yield; SMBt is
the return on small firms minus the return on large firms; and HMLt is the
return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-
market stocks ~see Fama and French ~1993!!. IPO firm returns are included
in the portfolio returns only for the period from four to thirty-nine months
after the IPO fiscal year-end. If the Fama–French return model is an appro-
priate expected return model, the intercepts are expected to be zero if DCA
has no effect. Thus, any remaining significant differences between inter-
cepts of the two portfolios can be ascribed to differences in DCA.
To ensure minimal differences in size and in book-to-market while main-
taining sufficient difference in discretionary current accruals between the
portfolios, we sort IPO firms into two portfolios. For the size-adjusted port-
folio regressions, all IPO firms are first ranked by market capitalization at
the end of the issue fiscal year ~adjusted to December 1997 prices!. Then,
from each contiguous set of four IPO firms, we place the IPO firm with the
highest DCA into an aggressive DCA portfolio, and the IPO firm with the
lowest DCA into a conservative DCA portfolio. Since contiguous size-ranked
18 A previous draft of our paper reports robustness of results for a sample of 1980 to 1989
IPOs when ranked variable regressions are used and when IPOs are eliminated if the Jones
~1991! industry cross-sectional regression coefficients are negative. For our current sample, the
estimated coefficient and significance of the DCA variable are higher when we include IPO
firms with less than $20 million in the regression ~without sample truncation!.
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Table IV
Fama–French Three-Factor Monthly Return Time Series
Regressions for Size and Book-to-Market Equivalent
Conservative and Aggressive (DCA) Portfolios
The sample consists of 1,649 domestic IPO firms going public in the period from 1980 to 1992 with an
offering price of at least $1 and a market capitalization of $20 million in 1997 prices ~in year 0!. The table
presents time-series regression coefficients from
Rpt 2 Rft 5 a 1 b{~Rmt 2 Rft ! 1 s{SMBt 1 h{HMLt 1 et ,
where Rpt are the value-weighted or equally weighted returns of the aggressive and conservative portfolios
in calendar month t; Rmt is the return on the value-weighted CRSP index in month t; Rft is the beginning-
of-month three-month T-bill yield in month t; SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return on large
firms in month t; HMLt is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market
stocks in month t ~see Fama and French ~1993!!. Firms are considered IPOs from the fourth to the thirty-
ninth month after the first fiscal year-end. IPO firms in the aggressive and conservative discretionary cur-
rent accrual ~see Table II! portfolios are selected to minimize size and book-to-market differences in the
following way. For minimizing size differences, all IPO firms are first ranked by market capitalization at the
end of the issue fiscal year adjusted to December 1997 prices. Then, for each contiguous group of four IPO
firms, the firm with the largest DCA is placed into an aggressive portfolio and the firm with the lowest DCA
is placed into a conservative DCA portfolio. The book-to-market adjustment is done similarly by first ranking
all IPO firms by their issue year-end book-to-market ratios. The t-statistic in the table is from the intercept
in an ~unreported! equivalent regression of the difference between the conservative and aggressive portfolio
returns on the factor returns.
Similar MV* Similar BV0MV
Statistic Conservative Aggressive Conservative Aggressive
Panel A: Value-Weighted Portfolio Returns ~in percent!
a Coef 0.052 20.658** 0.078 20.554*
p-val 0.839 0.032 0.807 0.058
b Coef 0.997*** 1.062*** 0.885*** 1.120***
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
s Coef 0.547*** 0.556*** 0.441*** 0.947***
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
h Coef 20.423*** 20.342** 20.602*** 20.409***
p-val 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000
OR2 0.735 0.674 0.614 0.748
a~Aggressive! 2 a~Conservative! 20.710** 20.634*
t-statistic 22.165 21.701
Two-tailed P-value 0.032 0.091
N 156 months: January 1983–December 1995
Panel B: Equally Weighted Portfolio Returns ~in percent!
a Coef 20.184 20.853*** 20.013 20.701***
p-val 0.408 0.000 0.946 0.006
b Coef 1.084*** 1.136*** 1.091*** 1.111***
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
s Coef 1.259*** 1.254*** 1.307*** 1.335***
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
h Coef 20.283*** 20.345*** 20.328*** 20.328***
p-val 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.005
OR2 0.842 0.849 0.875 0.818
a~Aggressive! 2 a~Conservative! 20.669*** 20.688***
t-statistic 22.796 23.087
Two-tailed P-value 0.006 0.002
N 156 months: January 1983–December 1995
***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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firms have very similar sizes, this selection ensures that size differences are
small while discretionary accruals differences remain large between the two
portfolios. The book-to-market adjustment is done similarly by first ranking
all IPO firms by their issue year-end book-to-market ratios.19 The time se-
ries of equally weighted and value-weighted returns are calculated for each
portfolio from January 1983 through December 1995 and the Fama–French
three-factor model regression is estimated.
For each aggressive and conservative portfolio, the regression produces a
single t-statistic on the estimated intercept that we use to test our hypoth-
esis about the relation between DCA and post-issue stock return perfor-
mance. Table IV indicates that the conservative DCA IPOs experience little
underperformance while the aggressive DCA IPOs suffer significant post-
issue underperformance. The estimated intercept for the conservative DCA
IPOs ranges from 20.184 percent to 0.078 percent per month, implying a
range of 22.23 percent to 10.94 percent abnormal performance per year.
The aggressive DCA IPOs have intercepts ranging from 20.853 percent to
20.554 percent per month, implying an underperformance range of 6.85 per-
cent to 10.73 percent per year.
The estimated difference in intercepts between the conservative and ag-
gressive portfolios and associated t-statistics is obtained from an unreported
time-series regression of the difference in the returns between the conser-
vative and aggressive portfolios on the factor returns. The estimated coeffi-
cients in these regressions range from 20.71 percent to 20.63 percent per
month. These estimated coefficients imply abnormal trading profits ranging
from 7.88 percent to 8.86 percent per year from a strategy of buying aggres-
sive portfolio IPOs and shorting the conservative portfolio IPOs over the
period when the IPOs remain in the respective portfolios. The t-statistics
associated with these coefficients range from 21.7 to 23.1, suggesting that
aggressive IPOs have statistically significantly poorer post-issue perfor-
mance than conservative IPOs.20
D. Fama-MacBeth Panel Regressions
The test specification in this subsection focuses on controlling for contem-
poraneous correlations in returns using the Fama and Macbeth ~1973! monthly
regressions. Moreover, we now use the firm’s own size and book-to-market
ratios, which are recommended by Daniel and Titman ~1997! as better pre-
dictors of returns than the Fama–French factor return sensitivities. A final
variation is that this regression allows us to compare the DCA inf luence on
IPO firm returns against its inf luence on non-IPO firm returns.
19 The members of the aggressive and conservative portfolios in this section differ from those
in earlier sections because here we control for size and book-to-market differences between
portfolios.
20 The accruals effect increases if we truncate the sample at the 1st and 99th percentiles of
DCA.
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One cross-sectional regression is run for each month, and overall statistics
are calculated by averaging the time series of estimated coefficients and
t-statistics. For each month, the returns ~in percent! for all firms with ap-
propriate data are regressed on lagged realizations of each firm’s own four
accrual variables, and the firm’s own market-capitalization and book-to-
market ratio as control variables. We include an extra size control for smaller
firms with equity capitalization of less than $100 million.
Our sample includes all firms ~with and without IPOs! that have suffi-
cient CRSP and COMPUSTAT data to compute our variables. Additionally,
firms must have a market capitalization entering the regression of at least
$20 million ~in 1997 constant dollars!, and a two-digit SIC code that places
them in an industry in which there is at least one IPO firm in our sample.
These criteria allow 2,472 firms to enter the March 1982 regression, and
4,230 firms to enter the February 1995 regression.
We run three sets of monthly cross-sectional regressions. The first set of
regressions, termed “16 to 1 17mo” regressions, contains 168 monthly cross-
sectional regressions; the first of these regressions explains returns in March
1982, the last explains returns in February 1995. The independent variables
are measured from financial statements closing six to seventeen months
prior to the measured return. For example, the cross-sectional regression
that explains returns in August 1985 uses accruals and other controls from
the most recent financial statements that closed between March 1984 and
February 1985. This same accounting information ~for March 1984 to Feb-
ruary 1985! is used in the “1 18 to 1 29mo” regression to explain August
1986 returns, and in the “130 to 141mo” regression to explain August 1987
returns. In sum, the first set of regressions uses independent variables from
financial statements in the fiscal year which lag six to seventeen months
behind the month of the dependent variable returns. The second set of re-
gressions relates returns to accruals in the fiscal year which are lagged
eighteen to twenty-nine months behind the returns. And the third set of
regressions relates returns to accruals that are lagged thirty to forty-one
months behind.
Each row in Table V summarizes the results of about fourteen years of
regressions, with one coefficient and one t-statistic for each independent
variable. We report the overall time-series average of these 168 cross-
sectional coefficients, and a t-statistic computed from the time-series of 168
individual month t-statistics which assumes only uncorrelatedness across
months ~but not unit-normality!.21 Using the t-statistics to compute signif-
icance is more efficient than averaging the estimated coefficients; because
21 More precisely, they are computed as m~tm!0@s~tm!0%M 2 1# , where tm is the t-statistic in
month m and M is the number of months ~168 or 166!. We also compute ~but do not report! an
overall t-statistic that assumes that each monthly t is itself normally distributed with mean
zero and unit variance, computed as %M 2 1{m~tm!. This restriction would raise the t-statistics
on our coefficient. For example, in the twelve independent variable regressions, the t-statistic
on DCA changes from 22.19 to 22.78 in the first row, from 20.80 to 21.03 in the second row,
and from 21.88 to 22.78 in the third row.
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Table V
Fama–MacBeth Panel Regressions
The sample consists of 1,649 domestic IPO firms going public in the period from 1980 to 1992 with an offering price of at least
$1 and a market capitalization of $20 million in 1997 prices ~in year 0!. Each row in Panel A summarizes the time-series
coefficient averages ~multiplied by 100! and t-statistics computed as m~tm!0@s~tm!0%M 2 1# , where tm is the t-statistic in month
m and M is the number of months ~168 or 166! from Fama–MacBeth monthly cross-sectional regressions. Each row summarizes
coefficients from 168 ~166! months of cross-sectional regressions. In the first row, the “16 to 117mo” ~3082–2095! regressions, the
dependent variable is the firm’s raw return ~in percent! in a given month ~the first return is from 3082, the last is from 2095; to
be included, a regression had to contain at least five IPO realizations!. Independent variables are firm characteristics that are
measured six to seventeen months earlier than each return month. The regressions contain 2,472 to 4,230 ~average 5 3,001.3!
observations per month!. The second ~third! row summarizes equivalent regressions, in which the independent variables are
measured 18 to 29 ~30 to 42! months before the stock return. The independent ~accruals! variables in the “IPO Accruals” column
are interacted with an issue dummy, i.e., they have nonzero values only if the relevant financial statement is the one immedi-
ately following the IPO. The boldfaced IDCA variable measures issue year (0) earnings management of discretionary current
accruals. Table II and Appendix A describe the details of computing the four accruals measures. Book-to-market and market
value act as controls for the Fama–French ~1993! variables. Both IPO and non-IPO firms are excluded in years in which their
lagged market value ~an included independent variable! is less than $20 million ~in 1997 dollars!, or when appropriate COM-
PUSTAT or CRSP information is unavailable. “Coef.” is the average of the monthly regression coefficients, reported in percent
~multiplied by 100!. Panel B provides time-series statistics for independent variables entering the monthly regressions of the “16
to 117mo regressions,” that is, gathered from the 168 monthly cross sections from 3082 to 2095. In each month, we compute a
cross-sectional mean and standard deviation for both DCA and IDCA. This panel then reports a time-series mean and a time-














Panel A: Summary Statistics for Sets of 168 Monthly Cross-Sectional Regression Coefficients
IPO Accruals All Accruals
Offset
Months Intercept
logS BVMVD log~MV! log~MV!if MV , 100 IDCA IDLA INDCA INDLA DCA DLA NDCA NDLA
~16 to 117mo! Coef 0.784 0.168 0.068 20.033 −1.569 3.331 20.244 2.276
~3082-2095! ~t! ~0.15! ~6.85! ~2.30! ~21.13! (−4.12) ~2.35! ~20.46! ~1.42!
~118 to 129mo! Coef 1.199 0.109 0.035 20.020 −0.412 5.778 2.239 3.517
~3083-2096! ~t! ~1.13! ~4.71! ~1.58! ~20.92! (−1.96) ~2.53! ~20.18! ~2.42!
~130 to 141mo! Coef 0.798 0.100 0.074 0.012 −2.836 23.536 21.481 21.344
~3084-12096! ~t! ~0.44! ~5.06! ~2.40! ~0.20! (−2.38) ~20.94! ~20.29! ~0.11!
~16 to 117mo! Coef 0.856 0.161 0.069 20.030 −0.845 2.921 0.115 1.500 20.774 0.723 20.471 1.228
~3082-2095! ~t! ~0.29! ~6.89! ~2.32! ~21.00! (−2.19) ~1.98! ~0.05! ~0.91! ~25.09! ~2.65! ~22.01! ~2.14!
~118 to 129mo! Coef 1.268 0.107 0.032 20.021 0.042 5.194 2.210 3.187 20.501 0.718 20.086 0.487
~3083-2096! ~t! ~1.30! ~4.81! ~1.49! ~20.95! (−0.79) ~2.01! ~0.09! ~2.15! ~23.22! ~1.11! ~20.74! ~0.82!
~130 to 141mo! Coef 0.869 0.099 0.073 0.011 −2.699 23.800 21.531 21.762 20.148 0.549 0.024 0.894
~3084-12096! ~t! ~0.61! ~5.25! ~2.32! ~0.12! (−1.88) ~21.14! ~20.19! ~20.17! ~21.32! ~1.98! ~20.12! ~1.63!
Panel B: Univariate Statistics on DCA and IDCA Variables Entering the “16 to 117mo” Regressions ~in percent!
Time-Series over 168 Numbers
Description Mean Std. Dev. Range
DCA Time-series over 168 cross-sectional averages 1.94 0.82 0.2 to 4.0
DCA Time-series over 168 cross-sectional standard deviations 33.73 25.18 12.5 to 119.9
IDCA Time-series over 168 cross-sectional averages 0.37 0.26 20.1 to 1.0
IDCA Time-series over 168 cross-sectional standard deviations 7.08 2.67 1.2 to 12.7
Time-series over 168 “percentage of nonzero IDCA” 3.76
Among nonzero IDCAs in each month, IDCA time-series over 168 cross-sectional averages 10.96 6.69 22.8 to 26.3















the early and late months with few observations are noisy and have low
t-statistics, these are appropriately down-weighted.22 We also impose an ad-
ditional filter that at least five IPO firms must be available in a sample
period because such months have undue inf luence on univariate means and
standard deviations, and coefficient estimates ~but not on the aggregated
t-statistics!. This filter disqualifies twelve months preceding the reported
regressions.
Table V presents the results of these cross-sectional regressions. ~Coeffi-
cients are quoted in percent.! IDCA is the accruals variable from the first
post-IPO financial statement; this is zero for non-IPO accruals. It measures
the inf luence of IPO accruals in explaining post-IPO accruals. Similarly, IN-
DCA, IDLA, and INDLA measure the inf luence of other IPO accruals. The
average monthly IDCA coefficient in the “16 to 117mo” regressions is 21.569
percent ~t 5 24.1!. As suggested by the time-series plot of abnormal returns
~Figure 2!, the IDCA coefficient is smaller in “ 118 to 129mo” regressions
but larger in “130 to 41mo” regressions. The average of the IDCA coeffi-
cients over the three post-IPO years is 21.61 percent ~5 2~1.569 1 0.412 1
2.836!03!. ~Its three-year t-statistic is 24.88 assuming i.i.d. unit-normality.!
To interpret the economic significance of this average coefficient, we make
use of the univariate statistics in Panel B.
Averaging over the 3.76 percent of firm-return months that are issue
months and so have nonzero IDCA, the average cross-sectional mean of IPO
discretionary current accruals is 10.96 percent and its average cross-
sectional standard deviation is 36.4 percent. This indicates that 2.11 percent
~5 1.61%{10.96%{12! of annual stock return underperformance can be attrib-
uted to an average level of earnings management in IPOs. As to performance
differences across conservative versus aggressive issuers, the three-year av-
erage IDCA coefficient ~21.61 percent! suggests that a one cross-sectional
standard deviation in IDCA ~36.4 percent! explains a 27.0 percent
~5 1.61%{36.2%{12! annualized return differential.
The cross-sectional regressions in the bottom half of Panel A address whether
the observed predictive power of IDCA for future returns is unique to IPOs
or is also common to non-issue-related DCA. Firms in other periods, outside
of the IPO event, may have other reasons to manage earnings, such as the
avoidance of debt covenant constraints or regulatory restrictions, the pay-
ment of executive bonuses, or the issuance of seasoned equity ~Teoh, Welch,
and Wong ~1998!!. Sloan ~1996! reports that total accruals can predict
one-year-ahead returns in the population of COMPUSTAT firms ~note that
he does not separate accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary com-
ponents!. We thus add a set of accrual variables, nonboldfaced, to denote
accruals that are not IPO accruals ~all accruals for non-IPO firms, and non-
IPO period accruals for IPO firms!. They measure whether accruals can
predict future returns in the general population of firms. ~General accrual
22 Fama and MacBeth ~1973! do not have this problem because their variables are not dummy
variables and are equally available in all months.
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coefficients have smaller standard errors than IPO accrual coefficients be-
cause there are many more non-IPO than IPO firms.! The coefficients on the
IPO-related boldfaced accrual variables now measure the incremental pre-
dictive ability of accruals to explain post-IPO returns, above and beyond
what accruals can normally predict for all firms during non-IPO periods.
The estimated general DCA coefficients average to 20.47 percent over
three years. The average discretionary current accruals population mean
~1.94 percent! implies that average earnings management accounts for 0.11 per-
cent ~5 0.47%{1.94%{12! annual underperformance in the general pop-
ulation. But, although IPO accruals are larger ~10.96 percent on average!,
the generic 20.47 percent DCA coefficient can explain only 0.62 percent
~5 0.47%{10.96%{12! of the post-IPO annual return underperformance, a small
amount of the rather large average post-IPO underperformance. A firm with
a one cross-sectional standard deviation more aggressive earnings manage-
ment measure ~36.4 percent! underperforms by 2.05 percent per year
~5 0.47%{36.4%{12! over the three following years, which is a respectable
but not overwhelming return differential.
More important for us, the estimated coefficients suggest that only a small
part of IDCA’s ability to explain post-IPO returns comes from a general
ability of DCA to explain post-IPO returns. When the non-issue-specific DCA
variable is added, the three-year average IPO-specific IDCA coefficient
changes from 21.61 percent ~in the upper-half of Panel A! to 21.17 percent
~in the lower half of Panel A!, and remains statistically and economically
significant.
Following the analysis above, the inclusion of non-IPO DCA accruals
reduces the implied mean IPO-specific IDCA effect from 2.11 percent to
1.53 percent annualized return underperformance and reduces the implied
one-standard cross-sectional deviation IDCA effect ~i.e., the predicted return
difference between conservative and aggressive issues! from a return under-
performance of 7.0 percent to 5.1 percent per year. This 5 percent return
differential per year is still relatively large and in line with our earlier es-
timates of economic significance. Note that when the IPO dummy equals
one, approximately 29 percent of the predicted underperformance is attrib-
utable to the general DCA effect, and 71 percent to the IPO unique IDCA
effect. This decomposition can be computed from the ratio of the IDCA and
DCA coefficients. Said differently, the estimated coefficients ascribe more
economic significance to the incremental IPO accruals inf luence on subse-
quent returns than to the general population accruals inf luence on sub-
sequent returns.
Our paper is concerned with the three-year, not one-year, effect. The summed
three-year total coefficient is always statistically significant. The weak DCA
coefficients in the middle regressions are consistent with Figure 2, which
illustrates only mild underperformance during post-event months 14 to 22
for even the aggressive quartile. The evidence suggests that our effect is
strong in the first year immediately after the IPO, weak in the second year,
and then picks up again strongly thereafter. ~The coefficient and t-statistic
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are also negative if we lag one more year, i.e., 42 to 59 months.! The U-pattern
in coefficients could be because of noise or because aggressive firms are
discovered either very soon or much later after their IPO.
To conclude, we find that the earnings management variable is incremen-
tally important during an initial public offering in explaining post-IPO long-
run performance.23
IV. Post-Issuing Activity
If our earnings management hypothesis is correct—that aggressive earn-
ings management leads to poorer aftermarket performance as firms can no
longer maintain appearances and must thus disappoint their investors—we
would expect to see that conservative IPO accruers issue more seasoned
equity offerings than aggressive IPO accruers, at least after the initial “de-
ception” period. After all, issuers cannot borrow from future earnings to
boost current earnings forever. The link between earnings management and
post-issuing activity could be mechanical ~in that aggressive earnings man-
agers eventually earn such poor post-IPO returns that they are unable to
raise capital in the SEO market!, or it could be direct ~in that aggressive
earnings managers lose the trust of market participants!. Both of these in-
f luences would be consistent with our hypothesis.
To test this hypothesis, we obtain a sample of seasoned equity offerings
from SDC ~1980–1997!, and match ~by CRSP IPERM! seasoned equity offer-
ings to their corresponding IPOs. Equity offerings later than five years after
the first post-IPO financial statements are excluded. Figure 3 displays the
time-profile of seasoned equity offerings by post-issue quarter. For the 1,649
initial public offerings, we find 635 IPOs returning to issue 868 seasoned
equity offerings. This frequency of SEOs after IPOs is similar to the rate
reported in Welch ~1989!, even though we examine only firms with sufficient
data to compute issue-year accruals. Issuing activity peaks about one year
after the IPO for all quartiles ~the highest slope in Figure 3!. Of the 412
firms in each quartile ~as defined in Table I!, 170 of the conservative IPO
issuers returned within five years with a total of 238 offerings. In contrast,
only 152 of the aggressive IPO issuers returned for a total of 199 issues. Put
another way, conservative issuers returned 20 percent more frequently than
aggressive issuers to raise funds in a seasoned equity offering. This differ-
ence is large enough to be economically meaningful, although alone it is not
large enough to serve as an earnings management deterrence for most IPO
23 We also experiment with a “venture-capital” variable ~VC! in our regression. SDC indi-
cates that 41.4 percent of IPOs in our sample are venture-capital backed. These venture-capital
backed IPOs are distributed evenly across the four quartiles from conservative quartile 1 to
aggressive quartile 4 as follows: 27.1 percent, 23.7 percent, 24.6 percent, and 24.6 percent.
Thus, VC-backed IPOs appear about as often in the conservative as in the aggressive quartiles.
When VC-backing is added to the set of twelve independent variables, the coefficients on the
VC dummy in the three yearly lags are 0.22 percent, 0.01 percent, and 0.36 percent, with
t-statistics of 0.06, 20.45, and 1.28 respectively. These small effects are inconsistent with Brav
and Gompers ~1997!.
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firms. This evidence is also remarkable in light of the Welch ~1989! signal-
ing model, which explains IPO underpricing with the desire of high-quality
firms to separate themselves. Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch ~1993! note
that high IPO initial returns cannot easily be attributed to issuer choice
because either issuers set a deliberately low offering price or because the
market surprises issuers in its unexpectedly high post-IPO valuation of shares
~“market feedback”!. They attribute higher reissuing frequency of underpric-
ing IPOs to market feedback. Our evidence here, however, examines a vari-
able ~earnings management! that is chosen by the issuer. If we equate “high-
quality issuers” with “conservative accruers,” then our evidence suggests that
higher quality issuers may indeed forgo pretending higher quality and may
be rewarded by being able to reissue more frequently after the IPO.24
24 This evidence does not imply that more conservative firms expect to return to the market
with higher probability. They may simply respond to the post-IPO stock return performance.
Figure 3. Cumulative seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) post-IPO by event month. The
sample are 1,649 IPOs from the 1980–92 period. Details are described in Table I. Firms are di-
vided into quartiles based on how aggressively they manage their earnings. Our measure of earn-
ings management is firms’ discretionary current accruals ~DCA!, which adjusts for industry, size,
and growth. Details are described in Table II and Section I.B. The graph displays the total num-
ber of seasoned equity offerings by quarter relative to the first post-IPO financial statements.
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V. Conclusion
This paper examines the relation between the long-run post-IPO return
underperformance and IPO firms’ earnings management. We find that dis-
cretionary current accruals—which are under the control of management
and proxy for earnings management—are high around the IPO relative to
those of nonissuers. The paper documents that issuers with higher discre-
tionary accruals have poorer stock return performance in the subsequent
three years. A firm classified to be in the most aggressive quartile of IPO
earnings managers experiences on average a 15 to 30 percent worse three-
year performance after its earnings report than a firm classified to be in the
most conservative quartile. This result is robust with respect to the inclu-
sion of other explanatory variables documented in the underperformance
literature, to alternative test specifications, and to alternative abnormal re-
turns measures. The IPO issuers in the conservative quartile also return to
the capital market for a seasoned equity offering about 20 percent more
frequently over a five-year period than those in the aggressive quartile,
indicating a potential post-issue benefit to less-aggressive IPO earnings man-
agement. These results are consistent with an inability of investors to fully
understand managerial earnings choices. Because investors behave as if they
are fixated on these high earnings, they are disappointed later.
These findings have implications for investors, firms, and accounting stan-
dard setters. Investors may want to use information contained in the pre-
offering accounting accruals to discriminate among issuers. Entrepreneurs
may want to consider how legitimate accounting choices can lower the firm’s
cost of equity capital or increase their own welfare. Finally, accounting stan-
dard setters may find these results useful for evaluating how much discre-
tion they should allow corporate managers to adjust reported earnings.
Appendix A: Calculation of Discretionary Accruals
The four accrual variables in the paper are: discretionary current accruals
~DCA!, nondiscretionary current accruals ~NDCA!, discretionary long-term
accruals ~DLA!, and nondiscretionary long-term accruals ~NDLA!. These
four variables are components of total accruals AC, measured using
COMPUSTAT annual item numbers in parentheses as follows:
AC [ Net Income ~172! 2 Cash Flows from Operations ~308!. ~A1!
When cash f low from operations ~308! is unavailable ~prior to 1987!, it is
measured as funds f low from operations ~110! minus current accruals CA.
Current accruals are defined as the change in noncash current assets minus
the change in operating current liabilities,
CA [ D@current assets ~4! 2 cash ~1!#
2 D@current liabilities ~5! 2 current maturity of long-term debt ~44!#.
~A2!
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Our paper follows the accounting literature in calculating current accru-
als as
CA [ D@accounts receivables ~2! 1 inventory ~3! 1 other current assets ~68!#
2 D@accounts payable ~70! 1 tax payable ~71!
1 other current liabilities ~72!#, ~A3!
which reduces the inf luence of nonstandard classifications of certain items.
Nondiscretionary variables are expected accruals from a cross-sectional
modification of the Jones ~1991! model ~see Teoh, Wong, and Rao ~1998!! and
the discretionary variables are the residuals. Expected current accruals for
an IPO firm in a given year are estimated from a cross-sectional regression
in that year of current accruals on the change in sales ~12! using an esti-
mation sample of all two-digit SIC code peers. ~The IPO firm and other
firms conducting an IPO or SEO firm in that year are not included in the
regression.! Thus, for the expected current accruals of an IPO firm i in year
t, we run the following cross-sectional OLS regression:
CAj, t
TAj, t21
5 a0S 1TAj, t21D 1 a1SD Salesj, tTAj, t21 D 1 ej, t , j [ estimation sample,
~A4!
where D Sales is the change in sales, and TA is total assets ~6!. Nondiscre-
tionary current accruals are calculated as
NDCAi, t [ [a0S 1TAi, t21D 1 [a1SD Salesi, t 2 DTRi, tTAi, t21 D, ~A5!
where [a0 is the estimated intercept and [a1 is the slope coefficient for IPO
firm i in year t, and DTRi, t is the change in trade receivables ~151! in year
t for issuer i. We subtract the increase in trade receivables from change in
sales to allow for the possibility of credit sales manipulation by the issuer
~for example, by allowing generous credit policies to obtain high sales prior
to the offering!. See Teoh, Wong, and Rao ~1998! for evaluation of the ro-
bustness of this measure relative to other measures. The results of our paper
are robust to omitting this adjustment.
Discretionary current accruals, DCAi, t , for IPO firm i for year t are rep-




2 NDCAi, t . ~A6!
To obtain discretionary and nondiscretionary long-term accruals, discre-
tionary and nondiscretionary total accruals are first estimated. The dis-
cretionary total accrual, DACi, t , for IPO firm i for year t is calculated in a
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similar manner as for current accruals except that now total accruals AC is
used as the dependent variable and the regression includes gross property,
plant, and equipment ~PPE! as an additional explanatory variable.
S ACj, tTAj, t21D 5 b0S 1TAj, t21D 1 b1SD Salesj, tTAj, t21 D 1 b2S PPEj, tTAj, t21D 1 ej, t ,
j [ estimation sample. ~A7!
Nondiscretionary total accruals or NDTAC are calculated as:
NDTACi, t [ Zb0S 1TAi, t21D 1 Zb1SD Salesi, t 2 DTRi, tTAi, t21 D 1 Zb2S PPEi, tTAi, t21D,
~A8!
where PPE is the gross property, plant, and equipment ~7!, Zb0 is the esti-
mated intercept, and Zb1 and Zb2 are the estimated slope coefficients for IPO
firm i in year t. Thus, nondiscretionary long-term accrual is the difference
between nondiscretionary total accrual and nondiscretionary current ac-
crual. Finally, discretionary long-term accrual is the difference between asset-
scaled long-term accrual and nondiscretionary long-term accrual.
We emphasize discretionary current accruals, DCA as the key variable
representing earnings management in the paper. Though discretionary long-
term accruals also represent earnings management, managers have greater
f lexibility and control over current versus long-term accruals. The non-
discretionary components measure expected accrual responses to changes in
firm business conditions, and so are not considered proxies of earnings
management.
To illustrate the calculation of DCA, consider Integrated Waste Services
Inc., ticker IWSI, CUSIP 457952, CRSP IPERM 76170, and SIC code 17.
IWSI went public in May 1990 and its fiscal year 0 month was December
1990. The relevant accounting data items to compute DCA are shown in
Table AI.
There were twenty-one firms in IWSI’s two-digit SIC industry: Amelco
~CUSIP 023438!, Amre ~032153!, Apogee ~037598!, Canisco Resources ~137587!,
Cerbco ~156713!, Diversified Communication ~254919!, Emcor Group ~29084Q!,
Enviroq ~293941!, Gmx Communications ~361911!, Heist ~423076!, Insitu-
form East ~457662!, Insituform Group ~457663!, Irex ~462683!, K D ~482447!,
KDI ~482452!, MMR ~553100!, Metalclad ~591142!, Naylor ~639349!, Ryan
Murphy ~783508!, TD ~87299Y!, and Williams ~969493!. Repeating the CA
computations for these firms, and estimating the Jones model yields the
fitted equation ~see equation ~A4!!
CAj, t
TAj, t21
5 20.014S 1TAj, t21D 1 0.121SD Salesj, tTAj, t21 D 1 ej, t .
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2 F20.01420.375 1 0.121S9.767 2 3.83720.375 DG 5 0.1593.
This places IWSI into accruals quartile 3, according to the quartile break-
points in Table II.
Appendix B: Methods of Earnings Management
Accounting earnings that conform with GAAP can be manipulated because
alternative treatments for accounting events are permitted. This section brief ly
discusses earnings management by choice of accounting methods, application
of accounting methods, and timing of asset acquisitions and dispositions.25
1. Accounting Method Choice. The choice of accounting methods affects
the timing of when revenues and expenses are recognized in income.
Choices that advance the recognition of revenues and delay the recog-
nition of expenses increase reported income. For example, the
“percentage-completion method” permits recognizing revenues in on-
going projects, whereas the “completed-contract method” recognizes
revenues only at completion. If input prices are falling, LIFO ~last-in-
first-out! costs of goods sold ~based on later lower prices! are lower
than FIFO ~first-in-first-out! costs. For depreciable assets, straight-
25 Earnings can also be managed by “real” decisions, such as timing and choice of invest-










Accounts receivable 5.985 2.148 3.837
Inventory 0.091 0.000 0.091
Other current assets 0.721 0.241 0.480
Accounts payable 2.162 1.385 0.777
Taxes payable 0.329 0.455 20.126
Other current liabilities 0.728 0.920 20.192
n IPO Current Accruals ~CA!: 3.949
Trade receivable 5.985 2.148 3.837
Sales 21.020 11.253 9.767
Total assets — 20.375 —
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line depreciation charges lower depreciation expenses more than ac-
celerated depreciation in the initial periods.
2. Accounting Method Application/Discretionary Estimates. Even after the
entrepreneur has chosen the accounting methods, there remains dis-
cretion in terms of how the accounting principles are applied. For ex-
ample, the entrepreneur has discretion in the estimates of service lives
and salvage values of depreciable assets, lives of intangibles, uncol-
lectible rate on accounts receivable, cost of warranty plans, the degree
of completion of long-term projects for revenue recognition, the actu-
arial cost basis for pension plan, and the interest rates for capitalized
leases and for pension accounting.
3. Accounting Method Timing. The entrepreneur also has discretion over
when and how events are recognized as accounting events requiring
disclosure in the financial statements. For example, he has discretion
over when and how much to write off bad loans and impaired assets, as
well as over the estimates of market values in the application of the
lower-of-cost-or-market method for inventory. He decides intent ~long-
term appreciation or short-term speculative classification! in the ap-
plication of marked-to-market accounting for investments to affect the
recognition of unrealized holding gains and losses. Furthermore, he
decides how events are classified. For example, a liability may be rec-
ognized as contingent, even if it is almost certain, thus avoiding rec-
ognition of an expense in the income statement. He may also classify
an indirect cost as a product cost rather than a period expense to avoid
showing the expenditure as an expense in the income statement.
4. Timing. The timing of asset acquisitions and dispositions can affect
accounting earnings as follows. The entrepreneur can choose when and
how much to invest in R & D, advertising, and maintenance costs, all
three of which are recognized as expenses in the period when the costs
are incurred. The entrepreneur also decides the timing of the sale of
property, plant, and equipment to accelerate or delay recognition of gain
or loss. The entrepreneur can accelerate or delay shipments of merchan-
dise to customers at the end of a period to affect the timing of reve-
nues. Finally, the entrepreneur’s own compensation schedule can be
altered to affect when compensation expenses are recognized in income.
The newsletter Financial Statement Alert, edited by Kellogg and Kellogg,
reports suspicious examples of corporate earnings management, some of which
may be fraudulent. The following summarizes some examples noted in Kellogg
and Kellogg ~1994, Part 3!:
• Automatix overstated sales by including ~1! shipments of equipment
before providing necessary services and other equipment for customers
to determine acceptance of product, ~2! shipments to foreign subsidiar-
ies before they were subsequently relayed to end customers, and ~3!
orders for goods to be shipped on trial.
• Alleghany International did not disclose facts about an unusual real
estate sale.
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• American Express and Fireman’s Fund swapped liabilities without trans-
ferring risks, and recorded premiums as income.
• Cannon Group failed to write down inventory.
• Cineplex Odeon Co. misclassified revenue items ~gains and losses from
asset sales are included in revenue from operations instead of other
revenues!, through choice of a fixed-costs amortization policy that al-
lows for significant managerial discretion ~fraction amortized depends
on the manager’s estimates of future revenues!, mislabeling captions
and misclassifying items ~labeling bottom-line net income as income be-
fore extraordinary items, hiding related party transactions in other cat-
egories of revenues and accounts receivable, mislabeling cash f low from
operations!, inf lating accounts receivables, and making inadequate pro-
vision for bad debts.
• Light Street Income Fund traded equity securities around ex dividend
date, and bought and sold other securities at a loss in order to include
dividend income as investment income and note capital loss, thereby
inflating operating income ~focus of analysts! without any effect on bottom-
line income.
• Marsh and McClellan failed to write down inventory, mark-to-market
equity investments, and record a material loss. In addition, they over-
stated liabilities.
• Oak Industries smoothed earnings by establishing reserves, capitalized
losses at start-up operations without proper establishment of reserves,
refused to write down losses when appropriate, did not provide for losses
on products that required further design work, and did not provide for
losses and write-offs of uncollectible accounts receivable.
• Prime Motor Inns included related party transactions in operating re-
sults, inf lated receivables with inadequate provision for losses, inade-
quately explained classification of asset categories, overstated revenues,
inaccurately reported segment results, inadequately disclosed potential
liabilities with third party transactions and related party transactions,
and deferred writing down impaired assets.
• Savin Co. capitalized research and development expenditures instead of
reporting them as expenses when incurred.
• Time Energy Systems reported management and incentive fee income
and R & D income before providing services.
• Wespercorp recorded sales before assembly and shipment, used im-
proper estimates of completion on long-term contracts, and unbundled
hardware and software components to pick up sales on hardware ship-
ments on long-term contracts.
Appendix C: Further Book-to-Market and Firm-Size Controls
Table CI cuts the sample into four categories based on book-to-market
ratio, four categories based on equity capitalization, and sixteen cross-
categories, and reports statistics on discretionary current accruals ~DCA!
and relevant market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns. The All column indi-
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cates that stock return underperformance monotonically decreases with firm
size, but there is no apparent relation in the All row—that is, within book-
to-market quartiles. The overall Pearson correlation of 20.065 and Spear-
man correlation of 20.141 are both significant at less than the 1 percent
level. The table shows that the predictive ability of DCA is not driven by a
small number of firms with certain firm size and book-to-market character-
istics only. The accruals inf luence patterns are also observed looking within
the cells. Thus, our findings differ from those in Brav and Gompers ~1997! in
that we do not find underperformance or the accruals effect isolated within
Table CI
Distribution of Discretionary Current Accruals Means,
Three-Year Return Means, and their Correlations in
Portfolios Classified by Size and Book-to-Market Quartiles.
The sample here is as described in Table I except that we do not apply the $20 million size
cutoff. Firms are first grouped into four equal-numbered quartiles based on each firm 's market
value adjusted to December 1997 prices ~MV* ! and into four equal-numbered quartiles based on
each firm's book-to-market ratio. Based on these quartile ranks, we construct subgroups ~“cells”!
categorized jointly by both the market value and book-to-market ratios ~these subgroups have
unequal numbers of firms!. For each cell, we then report the mean of our earnings management
variable ~mDCA!, the three-year buy-and-hold returns net of the respective market index ~mBH!,
















MV* quartile 1 mDCA 0.159 0.347 0.231 0.183 0.218
~small firms! mBH 20.546 20.395 20.236 20.236 20.319
up to $21.6m N 98 88 139 212 537
rpr 20.141 20.02 20.044 20.129 20.61
rsp 20.037 20.149 20.114 20.167 20.054
MV* quartile 2 mDCA 0.357 0.135 0.108 0.108 0.162
$21.7m–$58.3m mBH 20.417 20.196 20.170 20.278 20.259
N 106 110 149 173 538
rpr 20.066 20.155 0.096 0.002 20.056
rsp 20.172 20.334 20.211 20.036 20.197
MV* quartile 3 mDCA 0.089 0.056 0.067 0.027 0.061
$58.4m–$154.6m mBH 20.229 20.075 20.135 20.028 20.114
N 104 194 151 89 538
rpr 20.089 20.069 20.055 20.030 20.068
rsp 20.206 20.127 20.032 20.085 20.118
MV* quartile 4 mDCA 0.065 0.064 0.068 0.046 0.063
~large firms! mBH 20.003 20.127 20.087 20.117 20.034
over $154.7m N 229 146 99 64 538
rpr 20.051 20.092 20.051 20.187 20.048
rsp 20.096 20.209 20.069 20.241 20.111
All firms in mDCA 0.145 0.122 0.121 0.117 0.123
B0M quartile mBH 20.228 20.166 20.130 20.202 20.181
N 537 538 538 538 2151
rpr 20.086 20.072 20.013 20.086 20.065
rsp 20.164 20.150 20.118 20.136 20.141
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the small size and book-to-market cells only. Our earnings management vari-
able, DCA, shows some systematic relation with size ~larger for the two
smallest-sized quartiles! but not with book-to-market. ~It is not distinctly
different across book-to-market quartiles.! A strong correlation between re-
turns and accruals is present in many of the sixteen cells and there is no
apparent systematic pattern of where they are present. Thus, our DCA vari-
able is unlikely to be just a proxy for small size and low book-to-market. We
are fairly confident that our test specifications and controls allow us to test
the incremental inf luence of accruals in predicting post-issue returns with-
out significant contamination by size or book-to-market.
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